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This essay is an exploration of the debate between John Finnis and Stephen
Macedo on the value of homosexuality. In “Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with
Limited Government?” Finnis, a natural law theorist, rejects value-neutralist arguments,
stating that the political community can and should make value judgments about its
members’ life-choices and that such normative evaluations are compatible with
liberalism. Particularly, Finnis argues that homosexuality is in its essence always
harmful and degrading, thus unable to participate in the basic human goods it imitates.
Furthermore, he argues that the political community in liberal democratic societies is
justified in discouraging homosexual conduct as a viable way of life. Macedo, while also
rejecting pure value-neutralist liberalism, carefully considers but rejects Finnis’s
argument, which rests on an unrealistic description of value and ends of human sexual
activity.
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1 Introduction
Homosexuality is at the forefront of the culture wars in the United States today. Perhaps
most significant is the current nationwide push for constitutional (whether state or
federal) amendments defining marriage as an exclusively heterosexual union. Whether
these pushes stem from outright political maneuvering and rabble-rousing on the part of
politicians is not the issue. Most importantly, these rulings, legislative pushes, and social
trends show that the justifications for or against homosexuality and homosexual marriage
need a clarification from our greatest contemporary legal and moral philosophers beyond
what the scope of the law tells us. We need a forthright discussion of how to treat
homosexuality in the public and legal domains.
In 1993, Colorado’s Amendment 2 case Romer v. Evans brought several
important legal scholars into a direct debate over homosexuality and civil rights.1 Among
those legal scholars, John Finnis and Stephen Macedo continued the discussion about
homosexuality and the political community. This essay will explore part of their debate,
found in their respective essays from Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality, which
centers on how a liberal democratic society should treat homosexual acts.2
The dominant position among legal and political philosophers is that homosexual
activity and marriage should enjoy equal status with heterosexuality. Much of the

1

Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
John Finnis, “Natural Law Theory and Limited Government” and Stephen Macedo, “Against the Old
Sexual Morality of the New Natural Law” in Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality Robert P. George, ed.
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996). Hereafter cited as NLLG, and AOSM, respectively.
2
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prevailing literature argues that homosexuality is not inherently less valuable, and that it
is wrong for the government to criminalize or discourage such conduct. Not all legal
scholars share this mainstream view. Finnis represents a group of new natural law
theorists who argue that while homosexual conduct should not be criminalized, it should
be discouraged. His contemporary natural law theory has made a case for delineating the
foundations of limited government and with it what constitutes viable options for the
good life. With respect to individual autonomy, Finnis embraces the liberal tradition of
limited government that is sympathetic to plurality, yet rejects value “neutrality.”
According to Finnis, “a theory of natural law claims to be able to identify conditions and
principles of practical right-mindedness, of good and proper order among men and in
individual conduct.”3
But what does this mean? Essentially, there are certain basic human goods that
motivate reasonable action on the part of individuals, families, communities, and
governments, and delimit the role and scope of government. Finnis believes that
homosexuality is a distraction from some of these basic human goods and harmful for the
individuals who participate in it. Finnis claims his position is based upon a view of
sexual activity that is in line with human goods and the benefit of the individual. While
he maintains that homosexual conduct should be discouraged (and denied any
endorsement as a viable preferences for human activity), it is not justifiable to criminalize
these acts or the individuals who participate in them.
This paper is primarily a critical examination of Finnis’s view of the morality and
politics of homosexual activity guided by Stephen Macedo’s own rebuttal of the Finnis
3

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Claredon Press, Oxford. 1980), p. 18. Hereafter cited as
NLNR.
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position. Macedo, sympathetic to some aspects of Finnis’s natural law theory, carefully
considers but soundly rejects Finnis’s argument. For Macedo, Finnis’s view of sex is too
narrow and leads to absurd results. Finnis’s argument in “Is Natural Law Theory
Compatible with Limited Government?” can be viewed as two interrelated parts. First,
that homosexuality is in its essence always harmful and degrading, thus unable to
participate in the basic human goods it imitates. Secondly, that the political community
(in liberal democratic societies) is justified in discouraging homosexual conduct as a
viable way of life.
In this paper I will first lay out basic aspects of Finnis’s broader theory of natural
law that are relevant to this debate, including his description of basic human goods and
practical reason. Then I will describe their connection to limited government, explaining
Finnis’s anti-neutralist liberalism before bringing in his discussion of homosexuality.
Next I tie together Finnis’s view of limited government and homosexuality, exploring his
position on how the public (the political community) should treat homosexuality. In the
last two chapters I will explain Macedo’s critique of Finnis followed by an evaluation of
their exchange with my own conclusions.

4

2 John Finnis’s Natural Law
Basic Human Goods and Practical Reason
All human beings (as rational agents) are motivated to act by the things they believe to be
good for them. That is, they seek to obtain what they see as good and avoid what they
see as harmful. All human beings share the “basic human urge” toward a “few basic
values in a vast diversity of realizations.”4 Basic human goods are actualized though
human action (they are lived) by real individuals, and should not be understood simply as
abstract concepts. Finnis identifies seven basic human goods can neither be reduced nor
derived from other goods, and are the motivation and aim of action.5 Further, these basic
forms of human good are always reasons for action.6 The seven basic goods are:
friendship, religion, knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, bodily life, skillful
performance, marriage, and practical reasonableness.7 “Practical reasonableness” (or
practical reason) is what guides and informs us as to what the basic human forms of good
are and why and how we should seek them. For Finnis, individuals generally seek these
same (categorical) types of goods (with the aid of practical reason, itself a basic human
good), which he believes are fundamental and incommensurable with one another.

4

Finnis, NLNR, p. 84.
Ibid., p. 92, NLLG, p. 4. These goods are equally primary. There is no one Good, but a plurality of goods
that inform the many ways to live well.
6
There are other goods that give reasons for action, but Finnis thinks they can ultimately fall back into
these basic categories or combination of categories. NLNR, p.90. Sound reasons for action should always
pertain to some form or combination of forms of basic human good .
7
Finnis does not maintain that his description of the goods in this list is necessarily exhaustive or complete,
so it would be wrong to claim that these are the standards that we must always go by. Also, it is important
to note that I refer to the list in Natural Law Theory and Limited Government, p. 4. It differs slightly from
the one in NLNR, but substantially. The major difference is that marriage is independent in the newer list.
5
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To say that these goods are incommensurable is to say that they cannot be ranked
or measured against one another. According to Finnis, they are all equally fundamental
and indemonstrable as goods:
First, each is equally self-evidently a form of good. Second, one can not be
analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of any of the others, or to being
merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others. Thirdly, each one, when
focused upon, can reasonably be regarded as the most important. Hence, there is
no objective hierarchy amongst them.8
Although the basic human goods are in a sense equal, they are all uniquely special, and
all have distinct claims for their respective importance in fostering human flourishing.
For example, for Finnis it would not make any sense to say that friendship is more
important than knowledge. They are both self-evidently good and essential to a good life.
Individuals might value and emphasize one good in particular, but that does not mean the
other goods lose their standing as basic human goods. Individuals should pursue all basic
human goods in one way or another, with the inevitability of some taking precedence in
particular individuals’ lives.9 For example, aesthetic appreciation and knowledge might
be emphasized in and art dealer’s life, while a professional athlete might emphasize
skillful performance. “Each of us has a subjective order of priority amongst the basic
values.”10 Because of the multitude of choices for one’s life, there will be opportunity
costs incurred with respect to basic human goods, yet this in no way diminishes their
priority or status. However, it would be both wrong (practically unreasonable) to say that
one human good is fundamentally more important than another, just as it would be wrong
and incorrect to believe that other human goods can be excluded from one’s life.
8

Finnis, NLNR, p. 92.
Ibid., p. 85. “Human beings and thus whole cultures differ in their determination, enthusiasm, sobriety,
farsifhtedness, sensitivity, steadfastness, and all the other modalities of response to any value.”
10
Ibid., p. 93.
9
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Natural law according to Finnis is the theoretical and practical exploration of
incommensurable basic forms of human good and the basic requirements of practical
reason (itself a basic human good), which are the universal guiding platforms for human
action and political community.11 Therefore, natural law according to Finnis does deal
with making distinctions about what is both good and bad for individuals and groups of
individuals. That being said, Finnis claims that his version of natural law is not derived
from moral absolutes, whether theologically or metaphysically based. Instead, it is
explicitly concerned with determining what is reasonable and what is not: hence, he
favors “practical reasonableness” to “morality.”12 Practical reasonableness, one of the
basic human goods, takes on the (seemingly foundational) role of delineating and guiding
“good” human acts and ends.13
Once the basic tenets and methodology of practical reason are set out clearly, then
we can formulate moral standards on the basis of what is “unreasonable-all-thingsconsidered” and “reasonable-all-things-considered.”14 Practical reason is based upon
nine “requirements” that Finnis argues are self-evidently rational guidelines for
determining right and wrong ways to act.15 In this way, practical reason really guides us
in achieving the other basic human goods by helping us determine what one ought and
ought not to do. Therefore, Finnis claims that his natural law theory (as based upon
practical reason) is not a catalogue of moral pronouncements, but is instead the
11

It is practical, because human action is always concerned with the concreteness of life lived, and
theoretical, because it practical application requires some conceptual knowledge of the realm of human
affairs to be successful.
12
Ibid., p. 15, 23.
13
The importance of “practical reasonableness” for Finnis’s system is paramount, and raises more
questions than can be adequately dealt with here.
14
Ibid., p. 23.
15
Ibid., pp. 100-127. Such as not excluding any of the basic forms of human goods, formulating a life-plan,
remaining open to other life-choices and the choices of others, to not carry out acts that directly harm any
of the basic human goods, etc.
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explication of the natural tools we use to guide our actions. While morality is an explicit
issue for natural law theory, both morality and natural law are essentially concerned with
reasoning about our actions. “Natural law theory explores, expounds, and explains the
deep structure of morality, but morality is a matter of what reasons require, and reasons
are inherently intelligible, shared, common.”16

16

Finnis, NLLG, p. 3.
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Natural Law and Limited Government
The political community “properly understood” is “one of the forms of collaboration
needed for the sake of” basic human goods.17 The political community is the group of
citizens who come together to formulate the common good. The common good is the
“point” (or goal) of the “communication and co-operation” of the community, a goal that
is always concerned with some form of the instantiation of basic human goods.18
However, there are three distinct types of common good “which provides the
constitutive point of a distinctive type of community and directly instantiates a basic
human good.”19 Of these three, two of them play a major part in the argument put forth
by Finnis later: friendship and marriage. But for now, the common good is the
instrument of the political community in the service of achieving some goal or goals.
Both the common good and the political community are instruments explicitly formed to
help promote individuals in their fulfillment of basic human goods.
Finnis rejects the notion of a life of complete self-sufficiency, or “a life lacking
in nothing.”20 The social nature of human beings, their need for family and community,
is vastly dependent upon others: it calls for political community. The government, the
institution that serves as agent of the political community, is needed because human
beings exist in a plurality (a community), and some basic goods can only flourish fully
with certain institutions in place. The reason for constitutional government is not to solve
17

Finnis, NLLG, p. 5.
Ibid., p. 4.
19
Ibid., p. 5. To paraphrase, these are friendship, marriage, and religious community. These common
goods are basic goods in themselves, while other types of common good related to human association and
co-operation are instrumental.
20
Ibid., p. 7.
18
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the need for political community,21 but simply to aim towards “human integral
fulfillment” by formally articulating and carrying out the needs of the individuals that
make up the political community.22
Because all human action is in the pursuit of basic human goods, and all sound
governments (and political communities) are instruments in the service of achieving these
goods, no political, social, or legal theory can be “value-free” or “value neutral.”
Furthermore, according to Finnis, any sound (positive) law itself provides reasons for
action: it imposes authority and obligation by the fact that it conforms to practical reason.
Therefore, all positive law has a normative dimension in that it guides us in what we
ought and ought not do: a normative dimension imbedded both in its foundation (its aim
or purpose) and in its execution (it provides reasons for and against action). For Finnis,
only a theory of natural law such as his can explain and evaluate these normative
dimensions of the law, because it is intimately concerned with the most common and
universal reasons for action: basic forms of human good. It is a philosophy of human
action, and any sound analysis of law pays close attention to these fundamental reasons
for action in its descriptions. Practical reason and basic human goods provide the moral
and rational foundations for limiting the power of the government (i.e., both the
government’s function, and the extent of its authority).23
According to Finnis, the government is rationally limited in three crucial and
potent ways: by constitutional law, by moral norms, and by its “general justifying aim,
21

Finnis has a Aristotelian view of the political, in that the political community is a natural outgrowth of
man’s social and political nature. While much of convention is fabricated by man, the political community
is not purely creation for Aristotle and Finnis, as it is for others, notably modern philosophers such as
Hobbes who intended, to some extent, to solve the political problem itself.
22
Finnis, NLLG, p. 7. The complete fulfillment of which is impossible. Nevertheless, it is the goal and
aim of the political community and its reason for existence.
23
Ibid., p. 2.
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purpose or rational.”24 Practical reason tells us that constitutional government (and the
laws it supports) is instrumentally good and hence generates a duty to follow the specific
laws of a sound political order. Laws “should be based upon reasons, not merely
emotions, prejudices, and biases.”25 Therefore, practical reasonableness insists on the
Rule of Law (constitutional law) and not of Men.26
The political community needs the government to actualize the Rule of Law, with
the government creating, publishing, and enforcing laws. But the government must be a
free and open one, subject to debate and scrutiny, with the understanding that it can and
will err, sometimes against its own citizens: “the resolution of all these problems of
human rights is a process in which various reasonable solutions may be proposed and
debated and…settled…but does not pretend to be infallible or to silence further rational
discussion or…forbid…reconsideration.”27 Throughout this process, practical reason and
the “moral norms” of a society guide the law and its application. Moral norms or
principles are the “principles and norms of reason, which are limits, side-constraints,
recognized in the conscientious deliberations of every decent person.”28 These are the
moral principles insisted upon by society that are articulated through practical reason, and
thus apply to every individual, including government officials.
But most importantly, government is limited by its instrumental character.
Neither the government, nor the political community, nor the common good are
foundational and thus good in themselves. Instead, they are instruments with the purpose

24

Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 12.
26
Ibid., pp. 1-2. The Rule of Law is favorable to the rule of men according to Aristotle and Aquinas, and,
of course, lies at the heart of modern liberal government.
27
Finnis, NLNR, p. 220.
28
Finnis, NLLG, p. 3.
25
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of attaining basic human goods, the only true ends-in-themselves. Natural law theory
according to Finnis posits basic human goods as foundational, self-evident, nonderivable, and incommensurable, with the government the rational instrument of the
political community (itself an instrument) in the service of promoting these basic human
goods (through its promotion of the common good). Thus, Finnis believes that natural
law theory properly understood is not only compatible with limited government, but
directed towards it. Better put, modern, constitutional government can be properly
understood as the intention, or aim, of any sound natural law conception of good political
rule. 29

29

Ibid., p. 2. One that is based on the rule of law, separation of powers, elections, etc.
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Limited Government and Individual Flourishing
The overriding rationale for the government is to promote the conditions that the political
community has decided help insure human flourishing in the attainment of basic human
goods. This, according to Finnis, is the overarching function of government: to serve as a
powerful instrument in the service of individuals, families, and communities.30 Yet basic
human goods should always “trump” the collective interest or a collective enterprise
when there is a conflict, because it is inherently reasonable and logically consistent that
they should.31 Policy and legislation that is intended as advancement of some aggregate
common good (or interest) is an instrumental good meant to promote public morality.32
While the government can advocate a public morality, it should not fill the role of making
life-choices for individuals or groups.
Understanding the basic human goods as non-instrumental trump cards against the
instrumental common good begins to sound like a discussion of rights. Finnis would like
us to understand his theory as a more robust and accurate depiction than that of rights
(and of the human condition) because of the fundamentally non-instrumental character of
these basic human goods. Impediments to these goods are necessarily things to be
avoided at all costs, and excessive government interference in these goods amounts to
impediments (whether good-intentioned or not).
30

Ibid., p.6.
This is a different conception from Ronald Dworkin’s concept of trumping rights. See Robert P.
George’s Making Men Moral. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993)
32
Logically, the common good itself cannot be advanced if individual basic goods are restricted. Finnis
claims to have not only a better foundational understanding of basic human goods and natural rights, but a
more positive and consistent understanding of the relationship between individuals (and their claims to
moral independence) and the government.
31

13
If these basic goods are so essential to be like rights, how far can (and should) the
political community go in using the government to promote such goods, and how far can
(and should) it go to discourage behavior that it feels is damaging to these goods? For
Finnis, political community does go a long way in using government to secure conditions
favorable to human flourishing, and in discouraging the “harmful and evil.” But the
government should only be used in a limited way to regulate human associations:33
Such regulation should never (in the case of the associations of a non-instrumental
common good [e.g., friendship]) or only exceptionally (in the case of instrumental
associations [e.g., business partnerships]) be intended to take over the formation,
direction, or management of these personal initiatives and interpersonal
associations.34
The political community should never use the government to directly manage the lives of
individuals participating in basic human goods and the associations that actualize them
(e.g., marriage, friendship, etc.), even in some cases where vice is occurring between
adults. Therefore, Finnis argues that it is not acceptable for the government to coerce or
direct people by making “secret and truly consensual adult acts of vice a punishable
offence.”35
When in the search of basic human goods, even when that search is flawed, the
government can only discourage certain truly private acts. Yet it is not inconsistent for
the political community to foster those goods and activities seen as valuable and
reasonable, and to criticize those that are deleterious or injurious of human good. It must
always be balanced with a view to a distinction between private and public vice and
virtue: the restraint of limited government does not trump the promotion of public

33

Finnis, NLLG, p. 8.
Ibid,, p. 5. Brackets mine.
35
Ibid., p. 8.
34
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morality, which means that the human acts involved are tolerated legally but publicly
denounced.
This leads us to the central issue of this paper, and it should be clear that Finnis is
not advocating a stance of neutrality with respect to choices about the “good life,”
including homosexual lifestyles. While the human individual has a wide variety of life
choices that are practically reasonable courses of action for his life, some choices are
more reasonable than others. These adhere more closely to what practical reason says are
elemental to the basic human goods, while others do not (some are downright harmful).
Homosexuality is one such case of defective and harmful human action that mimics real
human goods. For Finnis, monogamous homosexuality is a defective form of friendship
and love. While it may resemble friendship and love, it does not share in the important
characteristics and traits that truly actualize friendship and love.
But it is not the duty of government officials to interfere with the independent
associations of its citizens. It is also important not to pursue overly aggressive
paternalistic policies and that “an attempt for the sake of the common good to absorb the
individual altogether into common enterprises would be disastrous for the common
good.”36 Thus, while homosexuality is viewed by Finnis as contrary to natural law, he
sees more harm than good37 in directly pitting the government against particular
instances of participation in such behavior. Yet the refusal to punish private, personal
acts of sodomy does not entail social, political, or legal tolerance of homosexuality and
homosexual lifestyles; it does not become manifested in a liberal prescription as an equal
36

Finnis, NLNR, p. 168.
Or, more precisely (as this implies a sort of weighing of moral choices and therefore a sort of
consequentialist or utilitarian ethical process), the good of citizens to act privately without constant
supervision supersedes the good of society in cases such as personal sexual conduct)

37
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and neutral conception of the good life, but rather as a sort of “don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy similar to the military position made famous under President Clinton. Finnis takes
a dual position on homosexuality and government which he puts forward as consistent
and non-contradictory: that the political community should not seek to criminalize
homosexuality, but it should seek to discourage and denounce it. At this point I turn to a
more detailed discussion of Finnis’s view of good and bad sex, after which I will flesh
out this “dual position” and his defense of it.

16

Natural Law and Sex
John Finnis argues that even the most monogamous and loving homosexual acts are
deluded, incomplete attempts to form the conjugal, heterosexual bond of marriage. Such
acts, even when done in the context of a loving, monogamous relationship do not meet
any basic form of human good (play, friendship, knowledge, marriage), but instead are
more closely related to masturbation. Whether homosexual or heterosexual in nature,
masturbatory acts at best treat one’s own body and the bodies of others as instruments,
and at worst are extremely degrading and injurious to those whom participate in them.
In fact, views that single out homosexuality without recognizing that heterosexual
acts done outside marriage (or performed in non-procreative fashion) are essentially the
same, reveal simple prejudices. It is wrong to consider the sexual acts of heterosexuals,
whether married or not, to be simply good while those performed by homosexuals to be
simply bad. Only biologically connective sex done with mutual affection within the
context of marriage is valuable, instantiating the basic human good of marriage (marriage
necessarily being limited to a man and a woman), a common good that cannot be
achieved by any other action.
For Finnis, sex is a good only when it meets the dual conditions of a biological
and mutual affection of friendship.38 That is, oral sex between married couples is still
essentially masturbatory in nature because it fails to meet the biological requirement, as
does all homosexual sex. Sex itself is not necessarily a basic form of human good, and
38

Finnis, NLLG, p. 15. Biological union of the penis and vagina which is the true method of conception.
The biological union has “procreative signifigance” even when it is done without the possibility or
intention of conception.
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good sex must meet the dual criteria of biological union and loving friendship within
marital conjugation (between a man and a woman).39 “Reality is known in judgment, not
in emotion,” Finnis says, indicating that it is not enough that two individuals simply feel
in love with one another.40 There is a real giving of oneself to another in marriage, a
friendship and mutual affection that gets expressed in the real biological union between
them. All other sex, Finnis (at least explicitly) considers to be purely instrumental
towards physical gratification.
Finnis relies on the classical and pre-modern tradition of natural law to lend
philosophical weight and authority to his placement of heterosexual marriage and sex as
essentially procreative and the only good form of sex. 41 He believes that the classical
thinkers had very deep and thoughtful reflections on homosexuality and heterosexuality
and unanimously concluded that the latter is the higher and more perfect good of the two.
Importantly, many of these thinkers were unbiased by revealed religion (the JudeoChristian tradition) and lived in homoerotic cultures, which makes them special
authorities.42 This authority comes from a presumed isolation from (what some might
call) prejudices, uncritical mores, or reactionary biases against homosexuals (especially
39

It is implied that marriage, as understood, reflects a deep commitment between two individuals that is
giving and whole. Certainly, marriages of convenience or ones in which a spouse is cheating, etc., cannot
qualify for participation in the full good of the conjugal, sexual union.
40
Finnis, NLLG, p. 15.
41
Finnis references a wide section of these thinkers, who he believes come to similar conclusions about
homosexuality: Aristotle, Plato, Aristophanes, Augustine, the Stoics, Plutarch, and Thomas Aquinas. It is
important to note, however, that his interpretations of these authors on the subject of homosexuality has
been subject to much debate and scrutiny. Most notably, Martha Nussbaum has been one of Finnis’s
biggest critics. Nussbaum has consitently argued a position that directly contradicts the one of Finnis. In
fact, Nussbaum testified in Colorado’s Amendment 2 hearings that homosexuality was never considered to
be immoral or shameful in classical Greece. See Martha Nussbaum and John Finnis, “Is Homosexual
Conduct Wrong? A Philosophical Exchange” Vol. 209 Issue 20 New Republic, 12 (1993). John Finnis,
“Law Morality and Sexual Orientation” 69 Notre Dame Law Review 1049 (1994). The exchange between
Nussbaum, Finnis, Robert George, and others regarding her testimony during the (in)famous Colorado trial
is intriguing and centers on some controversy regarding the interpretation of Greek texts and the Ancients’
views of homosexuality.
42
Finnis, NLLG, p. 12. Most notably Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
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Christianity). Finnis supports the general conclusions of the “Platonic-Aristotelian and
later ancient philosophical rejections of all homosexual conduct” with the aim of
supplementing his (new natural law) argument with theirs.43 He writes,
At the heart of [their] rejections of all homosexual conduct…are three
fundamental theses: (i) the commitment of a man and woman to each other in the
sexual union of marriage is intrinsically good and reasonable, and is incompatible
with sexual relations outside marriage; (ii) homosexual acts are radically and
peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason intrinsically unreasonable and
unnatural; (iii) furthermore, according to Plato, if not Aristotle, homosexual acts
have a special similarity to solitary masturbation, and both types of radically nonmarital act are manifestly unworthy of the human being and immoral.44
These conclusions are not only supported by a long history of great thinkers working
within the natural law tradition, but are available to us through reason and should be
endorsed in the public realm.
Finnis also argues that many early thinkers failed to fully articulate the special
status of marriage beyond that of its intention of procreation and family. He notes that
Augustine came close to articulating such a special status for marriage in his recognition
of the “natural societas” of the union of the two sexes.45 If marriage’s special status as a
human good stands solely on the basis of procreation and family, then sterile couples
would apparently be incapable of participating in this good. Therefore, there must be
something special and unique about marriage that is not limited to family and
procreation: it must truly be a special case and basic form of human good. Through sex,
husband and wife (although sterile) represent and function as a “biological

43

It is not only a supplement to his thought, however, as he sees his view to generally be in line with theirs,
stemming from and representing a reasoned and reflective approach to the subject.
44
Finnis, NLLG, p. 14.
45
Ibid., p. 13.
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unit…actualizing and experiencing the two-in-one-flesh common good and reality of
marriage.”46
Here it is important to note that Finnis is describing marriage both as a basic
human good and as a kind of (non-instrumental) common good. This appears to be
simply an identification required by the fact that there is a plurality involved, if only a
pair. The married couple is a sort of community, in that they are a spouses working
together as “complementary, bodily persons whose activities make them apt for
parenthood,” and they are suited for children yet still a community without them.47 This
common good (which appears to be some sort of synergistic reaction) exists even when
conception is not possible, because the biological union has “procreative significance.”
Procreative significance is foundational to marriage, yet marriage is not instrumental. It
is not a tool used for the sake of procreation and the production of offspring, but a good
in and of itself.48 It is neither instrumental for the good of each spouse, nor for the
creation of new life. This is the “fulfillment of a communion” that is an intrinsic standalone good: an “integral amalgamation of the lives of the two persons.”49
For Finnis, marriage represents a “double blessing.” It essentially actualizes two
basic goods that are common to both partners--friendship and procreation--yet is not
exclusively either one. Marriage is not merely an instrumental good for the purpose of
procreation and propagation of the species, but for the higher friendship that is actualized
in the “two-in-one-flesh” sexual bond.50 Therefore, even sterile couples who cannot
actualize the good of procreation can participate in it while truly actualizing the
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biological union and expression of their friendship.51 What is common with both sterile
and infertile couples is the intentionality of the act of sex: the uniting of one flesh in the
good of marriage, whether or not conception is achieved.
But does this physical union of two sexes imply an ought from an is? According
to Finnis it does not infer normative values from natural (biological facts), because the
procreatively significant sex act is not merely enough: it must include the mutual
affection of friendship within the context of a loving marriage. This represents a
combination of factors that reveal the difficulty in trying to accuse Finnis of deriving
moral norms from natural facts. Heterosexual relations can be means to simple sexual
fulfillment. But they also have available to them the expression of a deeper bond of
friendship in marriage through natural faculties given for a higher good, whereas
homosexual relations simply do not.
Again, for Finnis, sodomy is essentially the same as masturbation in that it is
merely an attempt to achieve some measure of orgasmic satisfaction. In this way our
bodies are a means to the end of satisfying our conscious desires for sexual stimulation.
The act of sodomy is only the utilization of another body to achieve the same desired end
as masturbation, just as many other body parts can be used (in a utility, or tool-like sense)
for reaching such satisfaction. Only conjugal love and sexual activity is the more perfect
form of friendship (the highest form): homosexual conduct is a mere imitation, striving
and failing to maintain the superior heterosexual bond and friendship. Finnis believes his
reasoned approach supplemented with the classical tradition is what separates new
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natural law theory from the arbitrary prejudices of many people who condemn
homosexuality. Because homosexuality is categorically the same as heterosexual nonprocreative sex acts (and adulterous ones), homosexual behavior is seen as unnatural
within the context of the recognition of the good of sex with a narrow, yet relatively clear
definition.
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3 The Common Good
I now return to the public element of this debate, and the “dual position” mentioned
above. How should the political community approach homosexuality within a natural
law framework such as Finnis’?52 Most importantly for Finnis, the idea that liberalism
entails that the government remain neutral with respect to conceptions about the good life
is false. He argues that not only is neutrality a bad idea practically, it suffers from
theoretical flaws in its description of private and public life.53 Finnis briefly takes on the
major theories that favor neutrality, including Ronald Dworkin’s, with respect to
conceptions of the good life. For Finnis, the issue in part turns upon how we view the
distinction between the private and the public.
Finnis claims that a simple demarcation between the public and private is not
possible, because people’s motivations and reasons for acting in the public must be
informed (or more likely overwhelmingly influenced) by their basic desires and
inclinations.54 However, Finnis does believe that we should stay out of the private
concerns of citizens at least with respect to criminalization. Yet there is no distinction in
making pronouncements about homosexuality: the public can and should denounce such
private acts as harmful to basic human goods. In this section I juxtapose the antineutralist position of Finnis with a neutralist conception of liberalism put forth by Ronald
Dworkin.
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Ronald Dworkin’s Neutralist Liberalism
Private conceptions of the good life, according to liberal theorists such as Ronald
Dworkin, should be kept out of the public discourse. When the political community
debates a public issue, it is necessarily driven by peoples’ personal motivations. We are
always motivated and act on the basis of those goods that we value, whether for ourselves
or others, by what Dworkin calls personal preferences and external preferences. While
there are public and private issues that we confront in our lives, our approach to them can
only come from the perspective of those foundational goods that spread out throughout
the human community: those that we value generally and cherish most.
External preferences refer to the ideals, or conceptions of the good life, that we
(as individuals) would like to see manifest themselves in the behavior of others. These
are the things we favor and disfavor for others. Personal preferences are just those
preferences we hold for ourselves. They are essentially self-reflective and not otherdirected as external preferences are. Yet both external and personal preferences bring
“pleasure when satisfied and displeasure when ignored.”55 Both are genuine desires and
it would seem that people would be genuinely motivated to pursue the fulfillment of both.
Dworkin argues that in pursuing policy and objectives aimed at the collective interests of
society, both personal and external preferences motivate and justify policy. External
preferences, however, should not be assigned “critical weight,” because any policy
decision based on them “invades…the right of citizens to be treated as equals.”56
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Dworkin specifically accepts that individuals often do act in ways that are
contrary to what is best for them or for their particular community. Sometimes people
participate in activities that are not in the interest of themselves (beyond impulse or
desire-satisfaction), but are instead decidedly bad for their own flourishing and wellbeing. Dworkin also acknowledges that people do not have a right to liberty in the broad
sense that they can do what they want to do, unfettered by government interference.57
Yet the government must always respect certain liberties because they are grounded in
firmly established right to equal concern and the right to moral independence: the right
for each individual to enjoy their own personal preferences so long as no one’s rights are
being violated.
Thus individual rights (almost) always trump the interest of the government (or
more precisely for Dworkin, the legislature) in promoting the instrumental value of the
collective good (public policy) when such policy conflicts with or acts to constrain the
civil rights of individuals. Such rights, or better put, the “liberal conception of equality,”
strongly curtails the community’s (and its legislature) limited concern with the (base,
dehumanizing, or degrading) purely self-harmful actions of its citizens, because such
concern implies a preference for certain types of action (or more precisely, particular
conceptions of the good life). When public policy conflicts with (or constrains)
established liberties or rights, then it should be overturned, whether the policy put forth is
concerned with the well-being of individuals themselves, or with promoting a broader,
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more universal social goal.58 In each case, the fundamental rights that individuals have
are binding and of higher political status than the aim of the proposed policy.
The ultimate principle(s) at work in this anti-perfectionist stand is the principle of
neutrality with respect to conceptions of the good life: specifically the government’s duty
to respect the individual rights and autonomy of its citizens to pursue their own versions
of such a life. Pure value neutrality, however, might not even logically entail that such a
principle be adopted by the institutions found within the system at large, or that such a
principle necessarily arise. For, value neutrality as a non-principle is only relativism.
And relativism cannot claim that value-neutrality is better than non-neutrality about
conceptions of the good life. Surely if my values must be respected by all, but if my
values incline me not to respect others’ autonomy, then we have reached an impasse. So
this political form of value neutrality does not grant people a type of open-ended liberty.
Thus, Dworkin must mean something both more nuanced, substantive, and
constrictive when he talks about neutrality. It is constrictive in the sense that neutrality in
the public realm is a type of good, or something to be pursued because it is better than
competing alternative types of political coordination. We might call this the “strongpolitical” sense of neutrality. But we might go one more step in identifying what this
sense of neutrality is. That is, there is possibly a more fundamental type of politically
desirable, non-utilitarian principle at work here. That principle is equality; or more
precisely, the abstract principle of equality that requires neutrality in conceptions of the
good life by treating all citizens with equal concern and respect. Dworkin clearly
distinguishes between “liberalism based on neutrality” and “liberalism based on equality”
58
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in A Matter of Principle, arguing that the latter is free of the significant defects of
neutrality.59 Dworkin elsewhere calls this the “liberal conception of equality.”60 Because
pure value-neutrality can cause inequality, “laws are needed to protect equality, and laws
are inevitably compromises of liberty.”61
In Dworkin’s essay “Liberalism,” he argues that equality is basically accepted by
liberals and conservatives alike. 62 That is, most reasonable people in contemporary
America believe in (and support upholding) equality as a political ideal. Such a version
of liberalism which embraces political neutrality, Dworkin writes, is not based on
skepticism or on an atomistic view of humans, nor is it “self-contradictory.” Political
neutrality based on equality is “a principle of political organization that is required by
justice, not a way of life for individuals.”63 In this essay and in Taking Rights Seriously,
he distinguishes two ways in which equality is a political ideal: as (1) “treatment as an
equal” and (2) “equal treatment.”64 It is both the (1) principle that the government treats
all its citizens with equal concern and respect, and (2) that the government does its best to
promote the basic conditions (equality of resources) needed for human flourishing and
well-being. The first principle of equality as political ideal is the truly fundamental or
constitutive principle, according to Dworkin.
This first principle of equality establishes the dignity of the individual against the
fluctuating preferences of society and the demands of government. It denies that there
should be an attempt at balance between the competing demands of society and the
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individual.65 For when the “government errs on the side of the individual, then it simply
pays a little more in social efficiency…” while erring “against the individual inflicts an
insult upon him” that “is worth a great deal.” By curtailing the social agenda or policy,
the government simply loses out on the possible gains that it might have achieved for
them. This is a hypothetical type of loss that has no real substance because it is based on
the possibility of future gains. But the loss the individual faces if the government
infringes upon his liberty is much greater, because it has true substance in the present.66
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Finnis’s Anti-Neutralist Liberalism
For Finnis, the Dworkinian position, with its strict demarcation between private, personal
preferences, and public, external preferences, represents a dualism that views the
individual as split or divided into two persons. According to Finnis, one’s public acts are
at the same time one’s private acts: they are part of one’s one and only real life.”67 For
Finnis, some life choices and actions are not practically reasonable and should not be
endorsed, whether truly private or not. If homosexuality is not a valuable life choice or
action, then individuals and communities should do what they can to discourage it. The
political community’s rationale requires that the state “deliberately and publicly identify,
facilitate and support the truly worthwhile, including moral virtue,” and conversely, to
dissuade the opposite.68 In this way the political community dissuades harmful behavior
for the sake of individuals’ well-being. Dworkin’s neutralist liberalism turns a principled
blind eye towards the unreasonable and reasonable alike and thus does a genuine harm to
individuals by not treating them as valuable.
But can we rely upon practical reason to tell us clearly what is harmful for all
individuals? Finnis’s system entails that the reasons and judgments that claim certain
human activities are good and valuable--while others are not--should be “widely
accessible” to all. He believes that all people have the capacity to understand the “best
reasons” for the value in marriage and the corruptive nature of homosexuality. 69 Those
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reasons must not be based upon prejudice or loathing. Any public or political
descriptions of homosexuality must be based upon sound reasons. Thus, Finnis argues
the ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick to be inappropriate because it fails to explain “why and
in what respects homosexual conduct is bad.”70 In line with the requirements of practical
reason and the Rule of Law, public morality should be based on sound reasons that are
clear and open to all, and not merely on the whims of the majority.
Some argue, however, that complex philosophical reasons and moral principles
might not be clear to all people. And clearly, homosexuality is clearly not considered
inherently harmful or “bad” in the eyes of many. But for Finnis, those who participate in
certain harmful lifestyles might be especially unreflective persons, or not fully realize
how and why they are harming themselves. He denies that the principles and reasons that
inform moral norms are inaccessible to the common or everyday man.71 Even the
classical natural law philosophers, he argues, do not claim that certain moral principles
are too obtuse or complicated for most people. Upon reflection (and sometimes a little
nudge from family, friends, community, etc.), almost everyone should be able to see the
reasonable or unreasonableness of moral principles and judgments. Many who do see
homosexuality as unreasonable do not have the explicit formulation of why it is wrong,
just that it is somehow opposed to (and in some hostile opposition towards) the goods
they do value.72 Even those who participate in such acts (including homosexuality) can,
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and should come to view them (if they reflect upon it carefully) as harmful and contrary
to their own well-being.73
Although only individuals can “make themselves good or evil,” the cooperative
nature of the political community reveals the non-individualistic nature of human action,
which requires that “fellow members” encourage “morally good conduct.”74 Remaining
neutral with respect to life choices is unreasonable because of the social and communal
nature of human life, and because of a person’s responsibilities to his or her fellow
humans. Dworkin’s argument against paternalist policies and attitudes is that they fail to
give due equal concern and respect to the individuals they criticize. According to Finnis,
criticizing the actions of a certain segment of the population (homosexuals) is reasonable
because it is compatible with respecting that individual’s well-being.75 It is not directed
at some instrumental common good, but towards the individuals themselves and their
own flourishing. Finnis argues that his version of equal concern and respect (formulated
in part with the assistance of Robert P. George) takes the person as a unique individual,
deserving of the best that is possible for him or her. Publicly denouncing homosexuality
does not neglect the good of the individual, but instead takes the good of the individual as
primary.
Finnis would like us to take for granted that “equal concern and respect” and
neutrality are not synonymous in the way that Dworkin contends. If this premise is
accepted along with the premises that all conceptions of the good life are far from equal
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in the eyes of liberal justice and that homosexuality is harmful and degrading to those
who participate in it, then some “publicly justifiable restraint” (of homosexual behavior)
is legitimate. That is, homosexuals can be constrained by the government in some
limited, but publicly justifiable ways. First, homosexuality should be discouraged, and
second, homosexual relationships should not be recognized by the law. For Finnis, any
public endorsement of homosexuality does a great disservice to the community through
hostility towards:
those members of the community who are willing to commit themselves to real
marriage in the understanding that its sexual joys are not mere instruments or
accompaniments to…marriage’s responsibilities, but rather are the actualizing and
experiencing of the intelligent commitment to share in those responsibilities.76
Granting homosexuality equal status does direct harm to the goods that heterosexual
married couples and families participate in. Because marriage is a basic human good,
individuals form and share views about what are practically reasonable characteristics of
marriage.
Yet despite the public intolerance of homosexuality, homosexual acts (when
participated in private) should be exempt from scrutiny and coercion at the hands of
political authority. The “government is precisely not...dedicated to the coercive
promotion of virtue and the repression of vice.”77 This is respect for the toleration of truly
private acts, even those that are degrading and incomplete forms of basic human good,
that reflects the greater duty (or more fundamental duty) of the political community to not
interfere excessively with individual associations. It is harmful for the political
community to pry and invade the daily lives and activities of individuals. Here it is only
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appropriate for family and friends to intervene, because only they would properly know
the details of one’s everyday life.
So government should not extend its scope to punishing private acts of
homosexuality: yet this is neither a tacit nor explicit call for neutrality with respect to
private lives. The public and political community should not through any of its cultural
and social outlets support masturbatory sex or homosexuality as a valuable human
activity. “Paternalism on the part of the political community is justified…like the
educative function of parenthood itself, to be no more than a help and support to selfcorrection and self-direction.”78 What is tolerated in the private is not necessarily, in
turn, tolerated or endorsed in public. There is a consistent principle involved here,
according to Finnis, and it rests upon the duty and role of government. The role of the
state, or political authority, is limited in its attempts to foster the conditions for human
flourishing. The private by its nature is hidden, and to a certain degree must be kept so to
retain the integrity and aim of the political authority. It is overreaching and harmful for
the government to be involved in punishing vice through paternalist policy. Yet the
actions of individuals, even when hidden and tolerated, are not granted equal
consideration by the political community. Those corrupt acts must not be treated as
acceptable, even in the context of being “private” and out of the scope of scrutiny. That
is, it is not simply a matter between consenting adults. Don’t ask, don’t tell really
requires a literal silence on the part of the participants.
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4 Stephen Macedo
But what if the fundamental distinction separating loving homosexual acts from
heterosexual acts within marriage is arbitrary? Stephen Macedo argues that it is.
Macedo believes that the natural law argument put forth by Finnis is wrong: homosexual
acts can express the same sorts of feelings that heterosexual acts do, and should be
considered morally justifiable by natural law. However, Macedo recognizes that Finnis’s
argument strives to go beyond the common prejudicial condemnation of homosexuality
by delineating the boundaries of the natural law teaching on sex that is “fair-minded.”
Within these boundaries, all non-marital sex acts (that lack procreative significance) are
treated similarly, with no special (discriminatory) status for homosexual acts as
“peculiarly perverse and unnatural.”79 Homosexuality is not especially degrading when
compared with other instrumental sexual gratification, including the sexual acts of nonmarried heterosexuals. They are all equally incapable of participating in the genuine
human goods they mimic because they are all essentially masturbatory.
Despite this apparent even-handed approach, such a strict and narrow definition of
“good sex” (non-instrumental sex) only leads to an unreasonable and incomplete view of
love and sex in general. Macedo insists that one should not stop at showing how both
homosexual and heterosexual sex are equally demeaning when purely instrumental (and
thus are equally reprehensible), but that the inverse should be true as well. That is, loving
monogamous sex between committed couples can and should be considered good
79
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regardless of sexual orientation. Once we do make a wise and rational reflection, natural
law theorists will begin to see that the distinction between homosexual love and
heterosexual love (in specific circumstances) is arbitrary and not reasonable at all. “The
new natural law’s own moral stance, properly understood, provides grounds for affirming
the good of sexual relationships between committed, loving homosexual partners.”80 The
natural law position of Finnis “properly understood” can reveal how committed
homosexual relationships can embody the same goods as committed heterosexual
relationships.
While Macedo finds Finnis’s position on sex too narrow and rigid, he is partially
sympathetic to the new natural law’s views about the possibility of the political
community making normative judgments about sexuality. Specifically, he finds some
agreement with them about the need to publicly promote basic human goods: especially
friendship and marriage. Macedo, like Finnis, takes issue with strict neutralist positions
(like Dworkin’s) regarding individual choice. When supporters of liberalism argue that
individuals should enjoy equal concern and respect in their personal choices (such as
homosexuality), they have not adequately defined what moral grounds such choices are
based upon. Instead, they have merely defended such activity on the basis that it is freely
chosen or self-directed. He writes that “mere choice and self-definition are thin grounds
on which to argue for the recognition of” rights for homosexuals.81 While Finnis takes
issue with Bowers v. Hardwick’s majority opinion because it fails to explain exactly how
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homosexuality is harmful, Macedo takes issue with Justice Blackmun’s dissent because
he fails to adequately defend the rights of homosexuals in a morally robust way.
The case for acknowledging Michael Hardwick’s constitutional right would have
been greatly strenghthened if it had been shown that doing so would provide the
opportunity for gays and lesbians not simply to define themselves or make
choices but to pursue the same sorts of basic goods, such as love and intimate
friendship, that are so central to heterosexual lives.82
For Macedo, homosexuals can participate in basic human goods, and it is imperative that
the argument for homosexual rights be based upon these terms. It is in the best interest of
homosexuals as individuals (Macedo would say that it is a non-instrumental good for the
sake of the individual) to have the right to express themselves in committed relationships
and for the political community to support and endorse such relationships.
Thus, Macedo supports what he calls “judgmental liberalism,” which admits that
“decent, elevated forms of human sexuality require a self-restraint and moderation.”83
The government does and should value some conceptions of the good life as better than
others, so we must not take strict value-neutrality as an unqualified central principle of
limited government.84 While some neutrality with respect to very controversial opinions
is necessary, it is not hypocritical to endorse certain life-choices, institutions, or
behaviors above others. “While liberal principles support a wide range of individual
freedoms, they also allow space for political judgments to be made about better and
worse ways of using our freedom.”85
While Macedo believes Finnis has unfairly stereotyped all homosexuals’
relationships as endorsing radical sexual liberationist policies, he recognizes severe harm
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to individuals and society both in promiscuity and views of sexuality (or of man in
general) that promote extreme freedom of choice.86 He writes that such “simplistic
celebrations of liberations from inherited constraints…ignore the potentially tyrannical
nature of sexual passion.”87 The lifting of traditional constraints and duties that come
with marriage and family (duties that are important for both individuals and society)
should not be considered part of the agenda of a homosexual movement that calls for
equal moral, social, and political consideration. For Macedo, making moral judgments
about activities that are genuinely harmful does not conflict with “the protection of a
robust and fair-minded array of basic rights.”88 Again, for Macedo, such judgments are
in line with sensible appraisals about what is harmful for individuals. The important
element is that we include homosexual relationships with heterosexual ones in promoting
the good of monogamy and marriage.
Within this context of limited agreement, Macedo believes he has a strong
critique of the Finnis position. Macedo claims that Finnis’s position equates all
homosexual acts to those promiscuous and non-procreative heterosexual acts:
promiscuity is a distraction from basic human goods, another form of the instrumental
use of bodies together with valueless relationships void of any bonds. Macedo believes
that for Finnis, homosexuals, when engaged in sex, are always being promiscuous: they
are always using their bodies instrumentally, and not towards and within the context of a
greater good and bond of marriage. Masturbation is like promiscuity, so that Finnis’s
description of all non-marital, biologically unitive sex is masturbatory and promiscuous
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by nature. Promiscuity is a genuine evil that distracts individuals from basic human
goods, so public morality should do all it can to discourage all types of promiscuous
sexual activity.
For Macedo, the breakdown of the family is (and to him, rightly so) inherently
heterosexual. It is heterosexuals who divorce, or have unprotected, unmarried sex,
abortions and unwanted children (it seems safe to assume he means that these are
children born out of wedlock, left to be raised by the single parents or the state).89 The
movement against homosexuals is therefore a sort of misplaced hysteria stemming not
from a real firm basis of immorality and social disintegration (partly caused or
contributed to by homosexuals), but from prejudice: a prejudice possibly exaggerated by
the current poor state of affairs with respect to the family and the values of it. “There is
a crisis of the family in America, but what could be easier…than to fasten our attention
on a long despised class of people who bear no children?”90 Furthermore, there is no
possibility of homosexual couples become pregnant accidentally and/or having unwanted
children. Macedo writes, “uncontracepted heterosexual sex risks the great evil of
bringing unwanted children into the world.”91
But Macedo points out that homosexuals can be monogamous, and he claims that
lesbian couples are very stable and monogamous.92 Promiscuity is a universal problem
and therefore a problem not with respect to types of sex, but of a greater cultural or moral
problem. Again, it is unfair to blame only homosexuals for the evils of society, and
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Macedo believes that the genuine good of the Finnis position is that it does not make such
a distinction. Macedo does seem to think that men overall are more promiscuous, and
that heterosexual men seem to be sometimes bound, or forced into monogamy by the
constraints of family and social pressures. So if the real issue is promiscuity, why not
extend cultural support to homosexuals (including the right to marry) and promote an
atmosphere of monogamy?93 Wouldn’t this only assist homosexual men in settling down
and becoming less promiscuous? Macedo’s view is that if the common good (being a
reflection of desiring the flourishing and well-being of individuals) entails leading
individuals towards the good life, then allowing marriage and publicly endorsing
monogamy for all sexual orientations should be embraced by natural law theory. But
because homosexuality can actualize such goods, according to Finnis, there is a barrier
stopping such endorsement.
Here we come to the most important part of Macedo’s critique of Finnis’ view:
that of non-marital sex. The first and foremost problem with Finnis’ limited definition of
good and valuable sexual relations, according to Macedo, is the grouping of all nonmarital and non-procreative94 sex acts into one general category. As we have seen,
Macedo sees a limited benefit in this grouping, because it breaks down arbitrary
distinctions between homo- and hetero- sex acts. But for Macedo, there is room for
further distinction, because even heterosexuals must acknowledge that sometimes sex is
neither purely instrumental (nor masturbatory) or intended specifically for procreation.
Surely, argues Macedo, some forms of non-procreative sex are better than others,
because “it is simplistic and implausible to portray the essential nature of every form of
93
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non-procreative sexuality as no better than the least valuable form.”95 Equating the
sexual exchange between an individual and a prostitute with sex between a pair of longtime friends or committed couples does and should strike one as being fallacious.
Macedo claims that although it is probably right to grant little to no value in promiscuous
sex, grouping such sex with all other forms of non-procreative sex without further
meaningful distinctions is wrong.
Next, Macedo extends this critique to sterile, heterosexual married couples.96
According to the Finnis, sex between these individuals, although the possibility of
conception and procreation is non-existent, is still valuable (it has procreative
significance) and good in itself. But what is the difference between this sex and the
hypothetical relationship a married homosexual couple might have? Macedo writes that
sterile, heterosexual sex would be “for pleasure and to express their love or friendship or
some other shared good. It will be for precisely the same reasons that committed, loving
gay couples have sex.”97
Furthermore, the distinction relies upon an incorrect perception; that sterile
heterosexual couples form a biological and personal unit. It may be a personal unit, but
Macedo points out that no special biological unity takes place between sterile couples,
because of their particular medical handicap. Macedo appeals to an analogy created by
Andrew Koppelman between penises and unloaded guns.98 It would be nonsensical to
charge someone with murdering another person with an unloaded gun, just as it would be
95
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wrong to ascribe the same unity in the sex act that results in conception with sterile
heterosexual sex. “It's far from clear in what sense, that has any moral weight, the genital
organ of a sterile man can properly and precisely be called a reproductive organ. It is not
fit for reproduction.”99 If merely having the right “equipment,” regardless of whether or
not its function is being fully realized is sufficient condition for meaningful sex, then
what is to keep someone who has had a sex change operation from meeting the minimal
requirements? Macedo points out that making “biological unity” such a central part of
valuable sex comes “perilously close to deriving an ought from an is.”100 More
importantly, however, it stresses the material aspect over the non-material aspects of
loving relationships. The commitment, affection, and care that individuals have for one
another appears to become subordinate to (and cancelled out completely in some cases)
simple biological facts.
When the natural law theorists broadened the good of sex to include sterile
couples, they made a commitment to endorse “sex as a good so long as it is bound up in
enduring intimacies, love, and shared commitments,” according to Macedo.101 Macedo
believes that sterile couples have, just as some homosexuals may, a fantasy or
misperception that their sex can be procreative. Finnis is wrong to argue that the sterile
couples can participate in this procreative good simply because they have the right
biological equipment (lacking some specific necessary part needed to complete
conception) because it is a real impossibility, just as it is in the homosexual acts of loving
couples (who, Macedo thinks might also strongly want to participate in). The
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components of intimacy and friendship between monogamous couples form a real
foundation for non-instrumental, valuable sex. Finnis’s natural law position that attempts
to make the intimacies, love, and shared commitments an integral part of sex gets
frustrated by his equation of all non-biologically unitive sex with masturbation. For
Macedo, sterile couples do participate in shared goods through sex simply because those
goods do not have to depend ultimately upon biological facts. So Finnis’s version of
natural law is right in broadening the scope of valuable sex to accompany sterile and
elderly couples.
If Finnis’s argument regarding the biological complementarity of sterile couples is
right, as Macedo believes it to be, then the only way to salvage the categorical
condemnation of all homosexuality must hinge on the non-existence of stable and loving
homosexual relationships. That is, by labeling homosexuality as essentially promiscuous
and masturbatory, it is incapable of participating in basic human goods. Macedo
contends that homosexuals can and do have loving relationships that are similar to
heterosexual relationships. Again, he agrees that many homosexuals engage in mere
promiscuity, just as heterosexuals do, and that it is right to condemn such actions and
liken them to masturbatory acts.102 But he argues that Finnis generalizes the common
misconception that homosexuals are promiscuous by nature to fit his argument. Empirical
evidence might show that homosexual men are somewhat promiscuous, but Macedo
doubts that the same evidence would not show heterosexual men to be very similar. So
how can we justify condemning one group (homosexuals) on the basis of actions
(promiscuous sex) that other groups participate if we do not think that valuable sex rests
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so heavily on the presence of one biological fact? Macedo answers that there is no
justification, and that Finnis has only succeeded in clarifying the most thoughtful and
deep condemnations of homosexuality as being based on arbitrary distinctions and
misrepresentations.
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5 Evaluation and Conclusion
Now that both Macedo’s and Finnis’ positions have been explained, a further critique of
their exchange is in order. I begin with an overview of points of agreement between the
two, after which I lay out a brief taxonomy for each with respect to their views of good
and bad sex. I will then discuss this taxonomy and my critique of it with respect to both
Finnis and Macedo. My critique of Macedo leads directly into a final discussion about
the range of valuable sexual expression. I conclude with my own position that there is
something unique and special about heterosexual marriage and procreative significance,
yet this does not exclude homosexual relationships as meaningful expressions of basis
human goods.
But first, I begin with an overview of points of agreement between Finnis and
Macedo. Both Macedo and Finnis seem to agree that society should be particularly
judgmental about sexuality. Promiscuity certainly should be discouraged, while stable,
marital relationships should be condoned and cherished. Both philosophers purport to
take a limited government approach to private matters of conduct while participating in
reasoned appraisal of what may or may not be “good” for the social order or community.
They both reject (pure or extreme versions of) neutralist liberalism, such as Dworkin’s
version described above, in this important respect: there are better and worse ways of
using one’s freedom, especially with respect to sexuality.
In essence, they both find liberalism consistent with value judgments about life
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choices.103 It is clear that promiscuity and divorce are problems within our society and
that those problems have roots and origins that need clarification and normative social
proclamations made about them. More generally speaking, there are genuine forms of
human goods that should be promoted, and actions that degrade or distract from those
goods that should be discouraged. Marital union is to be valued and promoted as a
genuine good (a good valued over less stable and more individualistic relationships),
while “open relationships” and promiscuity degrade both those who take part in them and
the common good in general. It is perfectly reasonable for the politically community to
discourage such conduct because such moral judgments are entirely compatible with the
well-being of individual’s and are thus in-line with equal concern and respect. I agree
with both Finnis and Macedo in their belief that rejecting pure neutralism conforms with
equal care and respect for individuals.
Their disagreement, as we have seen above, stems from their view of what
constitutes valuable sexual expression. What can we say is reasonable when it comes to
the sexual use of our bodies for something beyond pleasure? That is, when does sex help
actualize or participate in basic human goods (or is more than mere instrumental
gratification)? For Finnis, homosexual acts can never be considered as capable of
valuable sexual expression. And heterosexual acts are valuable when done in a loving
marital context. For Macedo, homosexuality can be valuable in certain contexts, just as
heterosexual acts are valuable in some contexts and not valuable in others.
Below is what I believe is a helpful (but ultimately overly-simplistic) clarification
on the good sex/bad sex views of Finnis and Macedo. Because the arguments herein
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revolve around sex (categorized as valuable or degrading), we can attribute a basic
taxonomy of sex to each respective philosopher:
Fα (Finnis’s “good sex”) = Procreatively significant sex taking place within a
loving, committed, heterosexual marriage. This sex must have the character of
being the biological connection or unity of the penis with the vagina.
Fβ (Finnis’s “bad sex”) = all sex not Fα. This includes any and all other sex acts,
whether done within marriage or not. Even sex within a marriage that has the
biological unity Finnis demands for Fα might fall into this category if it is not
done lovingly, or if the marriage is one of convenience, etc. All of Fβ is
essentially masturbatory.
Mα (Macedo’s “good sex”) = Sex acts that are done lovingly in a committed
relationship. The participants need not be married.104
Mβ (Macedo’s “bad sex”) = Sex performed instrumentally, i.e., for pure physical
satisfaction. One has little or no regard or connection with one’s partner beyond
the mutual gratification sought.105
I believe this taxonomy reveals two key points: First, that Macedo’s rejection of Finnis’s
good sex is perfectly reasonable and conforms with both rational argument as well as
experience. Second, that an over-simplistic view of valuable sex, resting on a good
sex/bad sex dichotomy (regardless of where you draw the line), fails to reflect reality.
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Critique of Finnis
The taxonomy above, as presented, may need to be qualified with respect to Macedo, but
for now it will be useful for my critique of Finnis. Finnis’s position, as I have outlined it
above, does not need any qualification. Finnis says “non-marital intercourse, especially
but not only homosexual, has no such point and therefore is unacceptable.”106 For Finnis,
there is something wrong about non-marital intercourse, but there is something especially
wrong and different about homosexuality. Yet he ultimately likens all non-procreative
sex to masturbation, thus not clearly making any differentiation between heterosexuality
and homosexuality in this key respect. He always connects homosexuality and
masturbation to non-marital sex acts (and even those marital sex acts that are not
procreatively significant), which leaves no room for admitting any types of varying
valuable sexual expression.
Let us assume that procreatively significant sex is the highest and most fully
complete form of sex. Does that by default rule out all other playful and loving sex acts
between spouses? While his definition of marital sex is complex and in some ways
edifying, his outright equation of all other sex with masturbation makes any and all nonprocreatively significant sexual expression between loving couples simple, selfish acts of
independent gratification. Finnis makes claims that are unreasonable both to
heterosexuals and homosexuals in his attempt to describe valuable sex in universal terms.
So it seems that Finnis has painted himself into a corner with respect to his view of
sexuality, especially in denouncing homosexuals. For if the point of married life is
106
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mutual affection, help, goodwill for the sake of the union, and sterile couples can
actualize these things just as well as fertile ones, why can homosexuals not participate in
this basic human good(s)?
Finnis’s natural law attempts to be consistent and universal but his position paints
a stagnant and unrealistic picture of “good sex” versus “bad sex.” Ultimately, his
consistency entails an absolutism that excludes too much and describes the realm of
human relationships in too simplistic of terms. His view of valuable sex (as represented
as Fα), is as Macedo points out, an aspect of his absolutism that is troubling to liberals. It
involves discouraging ways of life that may actualize participation in basic human goods.
It not only excludes aspects of sexual expression that many couples might find valuable,
it is overly simplistic in the way it lumps all bad sex together as masturbatory. It is not
necessarily the case that if sex does not meet a certain standard that it must be relegated
to the status of harmful and degrading. Why maintain such a rigid and narrow
understanding of sexual expression? Is it truly the case that all forms of sex ~Fα are
masturbatory to their core? Macedo is correct when he concludes that Finnis “provide[s]
no reasonable grounds for regarding loving sex within committed relationships as
morally equivalent to the most casual and promiscuous sex among strangers.”107 Such a
rigid demarcation should strike us, as Macedo says, as being grossly out of line with our
own experiences, hopes, and values.
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Critique of Macedo
For Macedo, I follow a similar line of criticism. While I ultimately agree with his
rejection of Finnis’s system as too rigid and narrow, his view of good sex also suffers
from being overly simplistic (or underdeveloped). Macedo’s discussion of valuable sex
is couched in his rebuttal to Finnis, and is not explicitly meant to set out a system of his
own, yet he does make strong judgments about when sex is and is not valuable. Now,
Mβ seems to genuinely warrant the disapproval of individuals and society, and Finnis
would surely agree. But Macedo’s argument for Mα seems to imply in many places that
as long as sex is done in a loving, committed relationship, it is valuable. This may be the
case, and it may be that the loving, committed aspect of sexual expression is the common
denominator of valuable sex. Yet this does not rule out further differences between
individuals and sexual expression. That is, it is not necessarily the case that since Fα is
too narrowly construed, we must accept Mα in its most robust form, or that the rejection
of Fα entails that all loving sex is categorically the same.
Macedo’s argument for accepting homosexuality is to show how loving but nonprocreative heterosexual sex and homosexual sex are really not very different. For
Macedo and others (like myself), the idea that Fα encapsulates all valuable sex really
clashes with their own beliefs and experiences. Acknowledging that all expressions of
love in sex must not necessarily have procreative significance, and that many couples
cannot achieve procreative significance because of sterility, allows Macedo to group all
types of sex in the second category together, effectively equating them categorically. Yet
in rejecting Fα, Macedo tacitly implies that all loving sex acts categorically the same.
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Whereas he explicitly states that neither absolutism or “utilitarian reductionism….are
adequate to the complexity of the moral realm” he fails to elaborate his position with
respect to the characterization of sexual acts.108
Therefore Macedo’s reasonable rejection of Fα in no way closes the door to
further reflection on the value of marriage and sexual relationships, and does not entail
that all loving sex is categorically the same. I would like to explore what the implications
of accepting the premise that Fα is too narrow, without necessarily accepting the robust
form of Mα. (i.e., accepting as de facto good whatever sexual activity is done within a
committed, loving relationship). First, however, a few points of clarification regarding
my (possibly unfair) taxonomy of Macedo’s good sex/bad sex. Macedo does seem to
leave room for adjustment and further discussion. Macedo clearly believes that sex is a
varied and complex thing, therefore my taxonomy above is not completely fair to him.
Furthermore, he may well embrace further distinctions between valuable and invaluable
sexual acts and agree that I have done him a disservice by forcing him into an either/or
system (like Finnis’s). In fact, Macedo points towards the possibilities of some further
differentiation in “Sexuality and Liberty,” writing that there might be to innate, natural
differences between males and females which gives heterosexual couples an added
dimension of complementarity that is missing from homosexual couples.109 I will return
to this point in a moment.
Despite these speculative differences, Macedo seems to believe that the political
community does not have any obligation or need to rank different sex acts. That is, sex
acts that are done lovingly should be viewed and promoted equally by the political
108
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community. In fact, he does argue that the political community should draw the line
where he has it, only pronouncing judgments on Mβ. The political realm should remain
isolated from any speculative discussions of differences or relative advantages between
homosexuality and heterosexuality. He writes that “speculative reasons for thinking that
heterosexuality has possible advantages may be inappropriate grounds for public
policy.”110 Both homosexual couples and heterosexual couples should retain equal rights
and encouragement to stability from the political community.
Macedo’s argument is partially designed to make the case for homosexual
marriage. He writes: “Extending marriage to gays and lesbians is a way of allowing that
the natural lawyers are not all wrong.”111 Macedo points out that the political community
has “legitimate” reasons to help “stabilize and elevate sexual relations.”112 So does
Macedo’s argument for homosexual relationships entail opening the door for homosexual
marriage? It seems perfectly reasonable for Macedo to draw the conclusions he does, and
it is a proper starting point for a debate about the possible value of homosexual marriage,
both for individuals and for liberal justice. If homosexual, committed couples can
express themselves in ways that include sexuality, some form of marital union seems a
legitimate way of helping to solidify their commitment. This does not entail, however,
that homosexual marriage should or can be essentially the same as heterosexual marriage.
A discussion of the merits of homosexual marriage versus those of heterosexual is related
to this debate, but should come out of a further look at how I have set things out so far.
Therefore, I first want to address the implications of accepting the premise that Fα is too
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narrow, without necessarily accepting the robust form of Mα. Should we not explore
such differences before accepting homosexual marriage?
I believe reflections such as the ones made by Macedo in his essay “Sexuality and
Liberty” help us move away from the simple good sex/bad sex dichotomy, while still
making moral judgments about sexuality. While sexual expression should always rest on
loving commitment, not all sexual expression is the same. In fact, it can differ in fact
both by the acts themselves, and by the participants. I see no reason why differences can
be discussed and evaluated within a greater context of limited government. That is, the
differences involved are important, meaningful, and I think imperative to any discussion
of homosexual marriage. Such a permeated understanding, I think, is desired to better
understand what is tolerable and intolerable, good and harmful, for individuals and the
political community.
It might be perfectly reasonable to make the case that there is something special
and unique about hetereosexual marriage and family. We might want to accept a more
curtailed view of Mα that puts heterosexual, married sex that participates in the tripartite
goods of friendship, union, and procreation out front. As Macedo points out, there might
be something truly unique and complementary about heterosexual marriage. He asks us
to consider an “original position” of sorts where we would have the choice of sexual
orientation in starting life anew in a world devoid of prejudice and where marriage and
adoption is open to homosexuals.113 In such an original position, would most people
choose heterosexuality over homosexuality? Are there “intrinsic” advantages to
heterosexuality?
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Macedo admits that heterosexuals share a unique “biological tie with children”
that is “unavailable to homosexuals by nature.” Now this obvious biological difference
itself is not debated, but its significance is of utmost importance. But Macedo “imagines”
a reason for a possible advantage of heterosexuality. This advantage turns on natural
differences between the sexes, differences he believes quite possibly exist, which gives
opposite sexes a kind of complimentarity missing in homosexual couples. This
complementary relationship is one built around differences that somehow fit together to
form something greater, and begins to sound much like Finnis’s discussion of
heterosexual marriage.
So with heterosexual spouses there is an added dimension beyond both their
loving bond and their biological unity (whatever its significance). This added dimension
is a complementarity based upon sexual differences, which does rest on brute biological
terms. Is Macedo saying that biological facts can inform our judgments? Not necessarily
in the political community, but such biological facts are so inextricably tied out with the
central issues here (valuable sex), that they play a major role in our judgments. These
brute biological facts, particularly the notion of procreative significance, are important,
and I think essential to the discussion.
Macedo rejects any significant difference between the loving acts of the sterile
elderly and those of homosexuals. Yet does sterile sex equal homosexual sex?
Biologically, it obviously does not, but such a distinction should not exclude
homosexuals. However, such a biological distinction might still merit a symbolic
distinction. For in marital contracepted recreational sex there is still an implicit natural
connection between the two sexes and the component of committed friendship within the
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bonds of marriage. The implicit reproductive end of sexual relations and marriage does
not exclude the possibility of participating in basic goods such as play and friendship
with either contracepted sex between fertile married couples, nor between infertile
couples. While such sex might not have conception as its aim (or a possibility) it does
involve a tacit recognition of reproduction and the good of marital union.
Such a view of heterosexual marital union does not exclude homosexuals from
participating in something like it, although they cannot achieve this sort of union.
Macedo’s challenge still stands strong regarding whether there is something inherently
promiscuous about homosexuality, thus making it problematic for Finnis to argue that it
should be publicly criticized and condemned. There surely are homosexuals who are
committed to each other with sex between them being an expression of their love for one
another--a love that might be well-expressed publicly through marriage. Yet we might
still publicly support arguments that claim there is something special and unique about
heterosexual marriage. Despite Finnis’s weaknesses, he makes a strong case for
something truly special and unique about some hetereosexual married couples. It does
seem that we should still take procreative significance seriously despite its clear flaws.
Remember that Macedo’s critique of Fα is strongly based upon sterile couples and does
not address the truly unique character of Fα where there is procreative significance.
It is clear that even to sterile couples the act of sexual intercourse is meeting many
of the basic behavior and biological conditions of procreative sex; they are simply
missing some necessary condition that prevents them from conception. Indeed, as the
natural law theorists point out, the union of heterosexuals is, to some degree, a union of
one flesh. They deny the unloaded gun analogy is comparable because they see the
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sexual organs of human beings are not instruments, or ‘equipment,’ which have
their value and intelligibility as means of accomplishing ends extrinsic to them.
Rather, sex organs are parts of the personal reality of the human being. Thus,
when spouses unite genitally-when they mate-their biological unity is truly
interpersonal.114
The sexual union of spouses creates a “biological unity” of one, symbolically joining
them in a greater good. The bodies of the individuals involved in this unity are more than
instruments, and you cannot break any part of the individual down into instrumental
parts. The bodily whole of each individually is connected through a biologically, yet
symbolically loving act.
The natural law theorists therefore carve out a unique and distinct realm for
heterosexual, marital sex that is both interpersonally and biologically grounded. The
biological component cannot be manifested between homosexual couples, thus denying
them this sort of unity. I admit that this sort of mystifies the penile-vaginal union, but
does it not have some sort of symbolic significance beyond the committed love and the
sharing of pleasure?

Macedo does not deny that the reproductive sex organs of persons

are for the purpose of procreation (and not simply sexual gratification), but he does play
down the important empirical facts of nature and how human beings go beyond it in
procreation with the establishment and maintenance of families. He wants to hold Finnis
to his contention that he is not vacillating between facts to norms (the existence of these
natural capacities to an “ought” is making an unconnected judgment about what one
should do).115 However, there might really be a special status for marital loving,
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procreative sex, which exceptions like the existence of sterile couples (and their ability to
participate in some of these same marital goods) does not destroy.
While it is true that people can give themselves in loving relationships that do not
meet Finnis’s strict requirements, Macedo must also, I believe, concede that the stronger
(or maybe higher) natural function of human sex is heterosexually oriented. But it does
not exclude the ability for homosexuals to participate in some reflection of this good,
despite their disability to conceive a child. Homosexual behavior within the context of a
loving, monogamous (marriage) relationship surely cannot be equated with masturbation,
as Finnis claims. So here is clearly some connection that is formed between same-sex
partners in a loving environment, which they consider to be similar to heterosexual ones.
However, the highest behavioral manifestation of sex is the good in marriage of a
combination of procreative significance and friendship is a bundled and indisputably
unique thing (as described well in Fα). What Macedo fails to establish (which he may
not desire to do) is the equation of this bundled conception with the most loving,
monogamous homosexual couples act of sex; in fact, his argument is only negative and is
based purely on Finnis’s incomplete defense of the obvious. While homosexuals and
sterile couples may both engage in loving sex that can never be procreative (although
with advances in technology this might easily change), non-sterile heterosexual couples
clearly can participate in the bundled conception of sex that includes love and the
procreative aim. He would in all probability agree with me here, but I do believe he
should make a stronger concession to it.
In fact, Macedo may only be looking for a reasonable place for homosexual union
to inhabit. The concession that loving, marital procreative sex (as expressed in Fα) is the
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highest ideal and expression of human sexuality, would be a judgment in line with
Macedo’s denial of the strict neutralist position on views of the good life. We might
accept part of what is expressed in Fα without limiting ourselves to it as a complete view
of human sexuality. This might allow for certain rights for homosexuals (or at least some
recognition that their sex can be valuable in some ways), but it would not be some
theoretically or categorically equal status with respect to natural law and the
understanding of human sexual love. Valuable sexual expression must not be simply
understood as Fα or Mα, but as a many faceted but hierarchical type of thing. And
ultimately, it is a private matter that the political community should take care in
appraising or ranking, while never interfering in the truly private acts of individuals.

57
References
Bradley, Gerald V., and George, Robert P., “Marriage and the Liberal Imagination,”
Georgetown Law Journal, Volume 84, 301, 1995.
Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
Dworkin, Ronald, “Liberalism,” in Liberalism and its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel, New
York University Press, New York, 1984.
Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1977.
Finnis, John, “Is Natural Law Compatible with Limited Government?” in Natural Law,
Liberalism, and Morality, ed. Robert P. George, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
Finnis, John, “Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation,” Notre Dame Law Review,
Volume 69, 1049, 1994.
Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980.
Finnis, John, & Nussbaum, Martha, “Is Homosexual Conduct Wrong? A Philosophical
Exchange,” The New Republic, Volume 209, Issue 20, 1993.
George, Robert P., Making Men Moral, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.
Koppleman, Andrew, “Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?” The American Journal of
Jurisprudence, Volume 51, 1997.
Macedo, Stephen, “Against the Old Sexual Morality of the New Natural Law,” in Natural
Law, Liberalism, and Morality, ed. Robert P. George, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1996.
Macedo, Stephen, “Sexuality and Liberty: Making Room for Nature and Tradition?” in
Sex, Preference, and Family, eds. David M. Estlund & Martha Nussbaum, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1997.
Sandel, Michael, “Judgemental Toleration” in Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality, ed.
Robert P. George, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.

